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last-touch. Popular publishers and those that appear early in the conversion funnel benefit the
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Introduction

Advertisers in online campaigns often choose to deliver ads utilizing multiple publishers that reach
overlapping target populations. The ads displayed on Google’s and Facebook’s websites, for example, cover more than 50% of the online advertising market in the U.S.1 When consumers multi-home
and visit multiple publishers during these campaigns, the ads they see often have a cumulative effect
that creates an externality between the effectiveness of ads across publishers.
Because the behavior of multi-homing consumers is stochastic, when planning multi-publisher
campaigns advertisers face uncertainty about the campaign’s performance. This uncertainty may
be about the effectiveness of individual ad exposures, the reach the ads may have, or the effect
from competition that targets the same customers. When buying these ads in an auction market,
the advertiser needs to take these uncertainties into account and ex-ante decide how to bid on ads,
resulting in ad allocations and campaign performance which is less efficient than if the advertiser
had complete information. These inefficiencies often result in severe degradation of effectiveness of
advertising campaigns, leading to frustration by advertisers and questions about the effectiveness
of online advertising. Procter & Gamble, for example, recently lowered their digital ad spending
because they could not prove its effectiveness.2
The literature on online advertising markets has focused primarily on the inefficiency of advertising campaigns created by advertising channel discoordination and asymmetric information.
This research takes the viewpoint of platforms and publishers, focusing on the actions they can
take in the market. A primary assumption is that by aggregating their information, publishers can
gain superior information compared to advertisers and can exploit this advantage to coordinate
the market and improve its efficiency. Examples include changing the pricing mechanisms in the
market to create incentive compatibility (Jordan et al. 2011, Johnson and Lewis 2015), or aggregating publishers into a network that can track and target individuals across different publishers
(D’Annunzio and Russo 2017). These assumptions, however, can be limited in their applicability.
One limitation is the fact that competing platforms such as Google and Facebook will be reluctant
to share and coordinate information or may be forbidden from doing so. A second limitation is
that advertisers are left with having to trust the publishers to tell them how effective their ads are
1
2

Source: IAB Revenue Report 2015, Alphabet 2015 Annual Report and Facebook 2015 Annual Report.
“P&G Cuts More Than $100 Million in ‘Largely Ineffective’ Digital Ads”, WSJ, July 27, 2017

2

in a market rife with moral hazard.
In this paper we take the viewpoint of an advertiser and analyze the campaign inefficiency that
arises when an advertiser buys ads on multiple publishers in a market with structural uncertainties.
We call an uncertainty “structural” when the information is symmetric (i.e., all players have the
same a-priori knowledge about ad efficiency), and when the publishers cannot resolve them fully
unless they change the market structure. Specifically, because consumer visits to websites are
stochastic and because bids need to be submitted in advance and independently to each publisher,
publishers are unable to discriminate between consumers who multi-home and those who do not.
Unless publishers collude and share information in real time or agree on a centralized pricing
mechanism, they will be unable to exploit targeted pricing or allocation for multi-homing consumers.
Unlike publishers, however, advertisers do have access to the complete information collected
during a campaign, ex-post. Because advertisers will not coordinate or cooperate with their competitors, their problem is viewed as a problem of measurement (of the uncertain state of the
campaign) and optimization given this measurement. The assumption is that once proper measurement is in place, optimization of the advertising campaigns will improve the competitiveness
of the advertiser, increase their profits and make the market more efficient. Consequentially, a
common technique that advertisers use with this data is multi-touch attribution, which is the focus
of this paper. Multi-touch attribution uses the information collected during the campaign to estimate the effectiveness of each publisher and the contribution of each ad exposure (“touch”) to each
response of a consumer. These estimates are then used to adjust the bids on different publishers,
with a goal of optimizing the campaign.
Although multi-touch attribution is commonly used to benchmark publisher performance,3 it
is unclear what the value of the process is and how to best make use of the data. In a recent
survey4 42% indicated that being “unsure of how to choose the appropriate method/model of
attribution” is an impediment to adopting an attribution method. The most common method used
by advertisers is called the “last-touch” method, in which the last touchpoint in a sequence of ads
prior to conversion gets full credit for the conversion. Another recently popular method is using
the Shapley value to assign the average marginal contribution to conversion as the credit for each
3

The IAB has called 2016 the “year of attribution” in its annual predictions for the year. http://www.iab.com/
news/2016-is-the-year-of-attribution/
4
Source: “Marketing Attribution: Valuing the Customer Journey” by EConsultancy and Google.
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touchpoint. Because these methods are in essence measurement methods of the uncertain state
of the campaign, the result of the measurement process will impact the bidding strategies of the
attributing advertiser.
The first research question we address is to understand how structural uncertainties impact the
profits and behavior of advertisers when they run multi-publisher campaigns. Because externalities
exist between publishers, the bidding strategies of advertisers, the equilibrium bids by competitors,
and allocation of ads by publishers may be different from when running single publisher campaigns.
Our model assumes that information is symmetric in the market, unlike most other research, and
assesses the impact of uncertainty when neither publishers nor advertisers have an informational
advantage. Although a significant body of research looks to understand the influence of asymmetric
information, risk preferences and monitoring capabilities online (see, e.g., Agarwal et al. (2009),
Wilbur and Zhu (2009), Mayzlin et al. (2014) and Hu et al. (2015)), we show that even with
symmetric information, symmetric risk preferences and full monitoring, the market will still suffer
from inefficiency where attribution may help as a tool. Because we assume that publishers cannot
coordinate through a centralized mechanism, and given the impact of structural uncertainty, we
focus on the potential of multi-touch attribution to increase advertiser profits. Specifically, we
ask under what circumstances an advertiser should expect a benefit from applying an attribution
method, and what the impact may be for competing advertisers and publishers. Answering this
question helps to explain why advertisers may be unhappy with the effectiveness of their campaigns
once they start engaging in multi-publisher advertising. As our results show, engaging in a multipublisher campaign changes the allocation of profits between advertisers and publishers, which also
helps to explain why many publishers support the efforts of advertisers to introduce attribution
solutions.
The second question we tackle touches on the effectiveness of two popular attribution methods
(last-touch and the Shapley value) when an advertiser competes with other strategic advertisers.
As we will discuss in Section 2, the majority of research on advertising attribution is empirical
in nature and focuses on developing more accurate measurement methods. A common issue with
this analysis, however, is the assumption that ad prices and competitor responses will not change
when an advertiser gains more information. These methods are benchmarked in a vacuum, without
taking into account how the market will respond to an advertiser who modifies her bidding strategy.

4

Analytical work on the topic also assumes a single advertiser that attempts to optimize her campaigns, disregarding the effects and responses of publishers and other advertisers. Our analysis, in
contrast, shows that the indirect equilibrium effects of applying an attribution method are substantial. For example, we find cases where using multi-touch attribution results in lowered profits of
advertisers because of the competitive positioning it creates for the advertiser. The analysis in this
case helps to shed light and derive insights about the tradeoffs that an advertiser faces when they
deploy different attribution methods. As we will show, although some methods are more accurate
as measurement methods, they may result in undesired equilibrium consequences for advertisers,
publishers or the market as a whole.
The analysis we perform assists in gauging the potential benefit for improved market efficiency
from the deployment of attribution methods under the current advertising market structure, in
contrast to the approaches that call for structural market changes by platforms. When analyzing
advertising market efficiencies, the prior literature has often focused on the potential of a method
to increase ad allocation efficiency, with the goal of increasing social welfare. Such increase in
welfare and allocation efficiency often came at the expense of the profits of advertisers, through
increased rent on the publisher side. Our focus on the division of profits between the advertisers and
publishers contributes to this literature by emphasizing the tradeoff between allocation efficiency
and advertiser profits. Since advertisers today (and especially the large ones) are questioning the
effectiveness of their campaigns, the results from our research sheds light on how the implementation
of attribution methods may impact the incentives of advertisers to stay in the market. A second
focus of the prior research on method optimality tries to asses which attribution method is “best”,
in the sense that it recovers the true uncertain state of the market. As we will show, a more accurate
measurement method may not always be more profitable for an advertiser because of the indirect
equilibrium effects it has. We thus question the assumption that more accurate measurement
methods that lead to increased competition will increase the advertiser’s profits or the ad allocation
efficiency in the market. Our results show that there exists a complex interaction between ad
allocation efficiency, measurement accuracy and advertiser and publisher profits.
In Section 3 we introduce our two-period game theoretical model. The model consists of consumers, two publishers and three competing advertisers engaged in an advertising campaign. The
consumers are homogeneous and visit each publisher probabilistically, in which case they are ex-
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posed to ads. Because the visit patterns by consumers are stochastic, advertisers and publishers
have uncertainty about realized ad exposures and their effects. When consumers are exposed to
ads, they may take an action we call “conversion” (e.g., clicking an ad, pressing the “like” button,
watching a video) which generates value for the advertiser. Because the consumer may see multiple
ads, the returns to additional ads may be increasing or decreasing. We focus primarily on decreasing ad returns, but mention the impact of increasing returns where appropriate. All proofs in the
paper appear in the Appendix.
Advertisers bid in ad auctions and try to maximize their profits. One of the advertisers is a
global advertiser who runs the campaign on both publishers, and the other two advertisers are local
advertisers, each running a campaign on one publisher only.5
The ad allocation mechanism we consider is a standard second price auction with impression
pricing (CPM).6 Although we use the term publishers, we have in mind large publishers such as
Google or Facebook. The publishers in our model do not take the role of an ad network that
allocates ads among different websites, which is why we interchangeably use the term “publisher”
or “platform”.
Section 4 contains a benchmark analysis that compares a global advertiser that does not use
attribution to an optimal advertiser who has complete market information. We find that when not
using attribution, both the global and the local advertisers will benefit compared to the case when
all advertisers are local, due to reduced competition because of ad externalities. In this case the
profits of popular publishers decrease, giving a plausible explanation for why large publishers (such
as Google) provide free attribution solutions to large advertisers to increase their competitiveness.
We also find that when advertisers value conversions highly, gaining full market information does
not increase profits and is useless. This result shows that advertisers with high-value consumers
should not expect to benefit from implementing attribution.
Section 5 looks at the impact of deploying an attribution solution by the global advertiser.
We show that the attribution problem is an instance of the teams problem identified by Holmstrom (1982), implying that a suboptimal number of ads will be purchased in the market and that
attribution will never achieve the optimal allocation an advertiser could achieve with complete information. We then analyze two common attribution schemes – last-touch attribution and Shapley
5
6

The online Appendix analyzes the case of two global advertisers.
The online Appendix analyzes the effect of pay per click (CPC) auctions with bid adjustment.
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value attribution based on Shapley (1952).
In equilibrium, we find that last-touch incentivizes an increase in ad exposures. This increase
results in over-exposure beyond the optimal level of advertising, limiting the benefit for the global
advertiser. We find that there is no condition in which last-touch attribution yields higher profits
for the global advertiser compared to both the Shapley value and to not using attribution. The
Shapley value, however, will increase ad exposure at the unpopular publisher, but may decrease
ad exposure at the popular publisher, resulting in increased profits compared to last-touch when
one of the publishers is unpopular. Counter-intuitively to common belief, we also find that lasttouch benefits publishers that come earlier in the conversion funnel of a consumer. The intuition
behind these results stems from the fact that last-touch is extreme in allocating the full effect of
the externality to the second publisher in the chain of visits. The Shapley value, in contrast, is
order agnostic and generally does not over-incentivize exposure at both publishers.
These properties raise two questions about the optimality of these attribution methods. Section
5.2 looks at the ad allocation efficiency in a market with attribution. As attribution is geared
to increase advertiser profits, this increase may result in decreased allocation efficiency. This
is because resolving uncertainties does not necessarily resolve externalities absent a centralized
price coordination mechanism. We surprisingly find that last-touch may increase efficiency beyond
what is achievable when an advertiser has full market information. This is not the case for the
Shapley value, however, that decreases market efficiency. Section 5.3 tries to determine how far
each method is from reaching the maximal potential profit for an advertiser. We find that all
methods perform well in the worst case scenario, yielding more than 85% of potential profit to the
advertiser. Altogether, these results show a tradeoff between attribution methods that improve the
overall market allocation efficiency, to methods that allow individual advertisers to increase their
profits.
Section 5.4 looks further into the question of the lingering stickiness and impact of last-touch
attribution through a comparative statics analysis. When we fix the attribution method, changing
the market parameters or changing ad effectiveness does not have an equal effect on the global
advertiser’s profit. If the advertiser can increase the effectiveness of their ad copy to elicit earlier
conversions in the funnel, using last-touch will increase the profit of the advertiser, while the
Shapley value and no-attribution methods will decrease the advertiser’s profit. This stability may
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be another reason for the popularity of last-touch. We also find, in Section 5.5, conditions where
the Shapley value not only decreases the profit of the global advertiser, but also decreases the
revenue of both publishers, yielding a lose-lose-lose scenario. In contrast, last-touch increases the
profits of the global advertiser and the publishers. When we focus on ad prices, we find that the
global advertiser will pay higher ad prices when using last-touch, and lower ad prices when using
the Shapley value. This may partially explain the pricing trend observed in advertising markets
today.
The discussion in Section 6 concludes with analyzing the limitations of the findings and implications for theory and practice. Our analysis shows that the effects of attribution are not trivial
and that the benefits may be limited in many cases. In general attribution will not yield the
optimal (complete information) profit for an advertiser because of the team problem it creates.
Moreover, there are cases when even gaining full information would not change the actions of the
advertiser, yielding little value to attribution. Analyzing these limitations have allowed us to give
further guidance and understanding to advertisers considering the development and deployment of
an attribution technology. Despite these limitations, we find that under a wide range of conditions
attribution does improve the profits of a global advertiser, may increase the ad allocation efficiency
in the market, and in certain cases also increases the profits of publishers while at the same time
increasing the profit of global advertisers. As such, attribution is a viable advertiser-side alternative
to price adjusting mechanisms or using information sharing on the publisher side.

2

Related Work

Recent work that employed large scale field experiments by Lambrecht and Tucker (2011) on retargeting advertising, Blake et al. (2015) on search advertising and Lewis and Rao (2015) on banner
advertising have found little effectiveness for these campaigns when measured on a broad population. The main finding of these works is that the effects of advertising are moderate at best and
require large sample sizes to properly identify.
The work on advertising ad auctions has generally focused on designing auctions with better
equilibrium properties (e.g. Kempe and Mahdian (2008)) or analyzing the impact of externalities
from other advertisers when they appear on the same page. In these cases, the auctioneer can change
their auction mechanism to adjust the efficiency of the ad allocation and correct for the externalities.
8

We contribute to this research by analyzing the second price auction when externalities exist among
publishers, but not on the same publisher, preventing them from correcting for the externality.
In the past few years, the advertising industry has shown increased interest in improved attribution methods. In a recent survey7 54% of advertisers indicated they used a last-touch method,
while 42% indicated that being “unsure of how to choose the appropriate method/model of attribution” is an impediment to adopting an attribution method. Research focusing on the advertiser’s
problem of measuring and compensating multiple publishers is quite recent, however, with the majority focusing on empirical applications to specific campaign formats. Tucker (2012) and Li et al.
(2015) analyze the impact of better attribution technology on campaign decisions by advertisers.
The papers find that improved attribution technology lowered the cost per attributed converter or
increased the ROI of the campaign.
Shao and Li (2011), Kireyev et al. (2015), Li and Kannan (2014), Anderl et al. (2014) and Abhishek et al. (2012) build specific attribution models for online campaign data using a conversion
model of consumers and interaction between publishers. They find that publishers have strong
interaction effects between one another which are typically not picked up by traditional measurements. In addition, Dalessandro et al. (2012) shows through simulation that using the Shapley
value can approximate the causal effect of different channels. Finally, Zantedeschi et al. (2015) and
Barajas et al. (2016) show how challenging the attribution problem is even when collecting data
using an experiment. The latter paper also finds that impressions with high baseline of conversions
would be allocated by a publisher to an advertiser even though this allocation may be inefficient.
Our contribution to this literature is the analysis of the competitive equilibrium, often ignored by
most empirical work. We are able, for example, to explain changes in ad prices, and take them into
account when analyzing the benefits of different schemes.
Theoretical analyses of the attribution problem are not common. The work by Jordan et al.
(2011) analyzes a similar problem to ours, but has a goal of changing the auction mechanism
to eliminate the need for attribution. In their model, the authors look at designing a bidding
and pricing mechanism that is efficient and maximizes social welfare when there are externalities
among publishers. In contrast, our work focuses on applying the advertiser’s problem to the
current common market mechanisms, when advertisers try to maximize their individual profits,
7

Source: “Marketing Attribution: Valuing the Customer Journey” by EConsultancy and Google.
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and analyzes what conditions in the market call for attribution.
Finally, the results of Agarwal et al. (2009), Zhu and Wilbur (2011) and Hu et al. (2015) consider
which payment schemes advertisers and publishers should use when different asymmetries exists
in the market. The main conclusions are that an advertiser can take advantage of her private
information to select different payment schemes. Our analysis, in contrast, tries to show that a
significant challenge still faces the advertiser when they are limited to a specific payment scheme
and when the information structure in the market is symmetric. These challenges can sometimes
be mitigated by an attribution method.

3

Model of Consumers, Advertisers and Publishers

Consider a two period market with three types of players: three advertisers, two publishers and a
continuous mass of homogenous consumers with measure 1. We use the term “publisher” to denote
a platform that facilitates the sale of advertising and its delivery. As such, publishers are websites
that both sell ads directly as well as display them to consumers (such as Google’s Search Engine or
Facebook). We assume these large publishers will not share information between them because of
competitive or regulatory restrictions. The case of platforms that can allocate ads between different
publishers in their network in the face of attribution is left as a promising avenue for future work.
We denote the two publishers as j ∈ {1, 2}.
Two advertisers in the market are local advertisers who only advertise on one of the publishers,
and one is global who advertise on both publishers. The global/local structure is common in the
combinatorial auctions literature (when bidders can bid on more than one item, cf. Krishna and
Rosenthal (1996), Ausubel and Baranov (2013)) and allows us to fully characterize the equilibrium
behavior of all players in the market. In addition, this assumption allows us to compare the effects
of moving from running a single publisher campaign to a multi-publisher campaign. Our primary
focus is on analyzing the competition of the global advertiser with the local advertisers, which we
label i ∈ {G, 1, 2} respectively. The online appendix analyzes the case of two global advertisers.
In the market, consumers generate revenue to the advertisers through ad exposure on publisher
websites, which are bought in ad auctions conducted by each publisher.

10

3.1

Consumers

Consumers in the model may visit a publisher’s website in each time period. If they visit a publisher they are exposed to ads and may take an action that is valuable to the advertiser called a
“conversion”.8
Visiting publisher websites requires the consumer to decide whether to visit each publisher in
each time period and in what order. We assume a consumer can visit each publisher up to once
during the two periods, and in period t they visit a publisher with probability pt when (p1 , p2 ) is
either (pH , pL ) or (pL , pH ) with pH > pL . This specification means that popular websites (pH ) may
come earlier or later in the consumer’s visit path. As a result, the world has four possible states,
which we denote as 1H, 1L, 2H, 2L. The first state, for example, means that the customer visits
publisher 1 first with probability pH and then publisher 2 with probability pL . We assume these
states occur with a-priori equal probability.
Modeling the order of visits and decisions to visit in this way allows us to analyze the dynamics
emerging from an advertising campaign and to disentangle the potential market power a publisher
has from being later (or earlier) in a consumer visit path, or being popular (pH ) or unpopular (pL )
in the market. In addition, modeling order uncertainty and visit uncertainty in such a way captures
advertiser’s uncertainty about the response of consumers to advertising.
When a consumer visits any of the two publishers, she is exposed to an ad from one of the
advertisers on the platform. The process that determines ad exposures is a second price auction
and is described in detail in the following section. Contingent on being exposed to ads, we assume
that the consumer makes a conversion decision following every ad exposure. After being exposed to
one ad the consumer converts with probability γ. After being exposed to a second ad, the consumer
converts with probability (1 + d)γ. d determines the externality that the first ad may have on the
second ad if it is shown. When −1 < d < 0, advertising has positive but decreasing returns, and
when 1 > d > 0 advertising has positive and increasing returns.9
From the point of view of an advertiser, exposing a consumer to one ad yields a conversion with
probability γ and exposing a consumer to two ads yields a conversion with probability γ + γ(1 + d).
If, for example, consumers can convert only once, but the second ad will have a similar effect as
8

Conversions may take many forms. Facebook allows for multiple campaign objectives such as accumulating page
“likes”, generating website visits through ad clicks, or generating video views. Google allows bidding on clicks.
9
We limit d < 1 to avoid extreme cases where the advertiser would like to bid infinitely high for an impression.
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the first ad on non-converted consumers, then d = −γ.

3.2

Publishers

Publishers in the model sell ads directly to advertisers through a second price auction. In this
auction advertiser i submits a bid bij to publisher j before the campaign.
If the advertiser wins the ad auction, her ad is being displayed and she is charged the minimal
amount that would have allowed her to maintain winning the ad.10
We model the advertising process as a second price pay per impression (CPM) auction. In this
auction, if b11 > b21 , then advertiser 1 wins the auction and pays b21 . We assume that ties in
bidding are broken randomly, though in our model they will appear with measure zero. We have
chosen to focus on CPM pricing since it allows analyzing a wide range of parameters in closed form.
Moreover, this payment method is popular in the market, and especially within display advertising
where attribution is the most relevant. The online appendix shows that the results qualitatively
hold under pay per click (CPC) pricing as well.

3.3

Advertisers

Each advertiser submits a bid bij to each publisher, and following a conversion by a consumer, an
advertiser i receives revenue vi . We assume each advertiser knows its own value for a consumer
conversion vi ,11 but does not know the valuation of the competing advertisers, which are a-priori
independently distributed U [0, 1].
A well known result (e.g., Krishna (2009), Proposition 2.1) is that in a single item second-price
auction it is weakly dominating for an advertiser to bid her value. Following this fact, publishers
such as Facebook state that “There’s no advantage to underbidding. In fact, doing so may lead
to losing auctions you would’ve otherwise won at no additional cost”.12 One of our first findings
shows that this recommendation is incorrect for global advertisers facing externalities.
As mentioned before, advertisers can be either local or global advertisers. Local advertisers
show ads only on one platform, and as a result submit only one bid. Moreover, because these
10

Google states “the most you’ll pay is what’s minimally required to hold your ad position” (http://support.
google.com/adwords/answer/6297?hl=en). Facebook states “The amount you get charged is the minimum amount
you would’ve needed to set your advertiser bid at to win the auction.” (http://www.facebook.com/business/help/
430291176997542).
11
Advertisers can learn the value of a conversion through running an initial experiment prior to the campaign.
12
http://www.facebook.com/business/help/952192354843755.
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advertisers do not compete for advertising on multiple publishers, they do not face an attribution
problem – all of their sales will be attributed to the specific platform where they advertise. We will
therefore label advertiser 1’s bid b1 and advertiser’s 2’s bid b2 , and assume that advertiser 1 bids
at publisher 1 while advertiser 2 bids at publisher 2.
The global advertiser will submit bids bG1 and bG2 to publishers 1 and 2 respectively. Since the
global advertiser does not know in advance the state of the world, she will have to maximize her
expected profit when setting the bids. We will analyze how accounting for uncertainty using an
attribution process impacts the profits of the global advertiser and analyze the effects of different
attribution methods on the market as a whole.

3.4

Timing and Information Structure

The goal of the assumptions in our model is to minimize information asymmetry and preference
asymmetry between publishers and advertisers that may drive our results and show that spillovers
between advertising channels along with uncertainty about consumer visits are enough to generate
substantial market inefficiencies.
We assume the values of pH , pL , γ and d are public knowledge. γ and d can be estimated by
advertisers through running a simple experiment and assessing the behavior of consumers exposed
to a single ad or a couple of ads. Publishers will have this information from historical data and by
observing the experiments run by advertisers. Uncertainty about the conversion rate γ will cause
advertisers to use their expected values. The results of the paper follow through in this case.
The state of the world (the order of consumer visits to publishers, and whether a publisher is
popular or not for this campaign) is unknown to both publishers and advertisers a-priori. Each
publisher knows whether a consumer visited their own site, but does not know whether a consumer
visited or will visit the other publisher. Publishers also know the bids of both advertisers on their
platform, but do not know the bids at the other publisher.
Advertisers know their own valuation for a consumer action vi , but do not know the valuation
of the other advertiser.
The timing of the game is as following:
1. The global advertiser submits bids to both publishers. Local advertisers submit one bid.
2. Nature determines the order of visits of consumers to publishers and which publisher is
13

popular. Assume, e.g., it is first publisher 1 and then 2, and publisher i is visited with
probability pi .
3. In period 1, nature determines if a consumer visits publisher 1 with prob. p1 . If she does, an
auction is run; the winning advertiser displays an ad to the consumer, and pays the second
highest bid for it.
4. If the consumer visits a publisher in period 1 and sees an ad from advertiser i:
• She will convert with probability γ.
• The advertiser will receive revenue vi if the consumer converted.
5. In period 2, nature determines if a consumer visits publisher 2 with prob. p2 . If she does, an
auction is run; the winning advertiser displays an ad to the consumer, and pays the second
highest bid for it.
6. If the consumer visited a publisher in period 2 and sees an ad from advertiser i:
• She will convert with probability (1 + d)γ if she had seen an ad from advertiser i in
period 1. Otherwise, she converts with probability γ.
• The advertiser will receive revenue vi if the consumer converted.

4

Benchmark Equilibrium Without Attribution

To understand the motivation for the creation of attribution methods, we first assume that the
advertisers do not know the state of customer visits and each maximizes their expected profit.
If a local advertiser i faces a global advertiser that bids bGi with cumulative distribution FGi (·)
at publisher i then her expected profit is:
Z
πi (bi ) = 1/2(pH + pL )
0

∞

pH + pL
I[bi > bGi ](γvi − bGi )dFGi (bGi ) =
2

Z

bi

(γvi − bGi )dFGi (bGi ) (1)
0

Suppose the state of the world is 1H (consumers first visit advertiser 1 with prob. pH ). If the
local advertisers bid according to bid distributions with CDFs F1 and F2 , then the expected profit
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in this state of a global advertiser who bids BG1 and BG2 will be:
Z ∞
I[bG1 > b1 ](γvG − b1 )dF1 (b1 )
πG (bG1 , bG2 |1H) = pH (1 − pL )
0
Z ∞
I[bG2 > b2 ](γvG − b2 )dF2 (b2 )
+(1 − pH )pL
0
Z ∞Z ∞
I[bG1 <= b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ](γvG − b2 )dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
+pH pL
Z0 ∞ Z0 ∞
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 <= b2 ](γvG − b1 )dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
+pH pL
0
0
Z ∞Z ∞
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ]((γ + γ(1 + d))vG − b1 − b2 )dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 ) (2)
+pH pL
0

0

Simplifying and taking the expectation over the four states we receive:
Z
pH + pL bG1
πG (bG1 , bG2 ) =
(γvG − b1 )dF1 (b1 )
2
0
Z
pH + pL bG2
(γvG − b2 )dF2 (b2 )
+
2
0
+pH pL dγvG F1 (bG1 )F2 (bG2 )

(3)

The last additive shows the effect of the externality and uncertainty about the profit of a global
advertiser compared to a local advertiser. Holding all else constant, the profit of the advertiser
increases with increasing returns of advertising (positive d) and may decrease with decreasing
advertising returns (negative d).
In second price auctions there are often multiple equilibria because the equilibrium strategies are
weakly dominating. If a bidder bids above the highest bid of the other bidder, they can increase
(or decrease) their bid without affecting their or the other bidder’s profit, nor the allocation of
the auction items. Therefore, when we report equilibrium bidding strategies we will report the
continuously differentiable strategies, but also indicate when the advertisers can lower their bids
from this equilibrium while maintaining the same profit.
An analysis of the full equilibrium without attribution (called N A) shows the following results
about the equilibrium bids of the global advertiser:
Lemma 1. When a global advertiser competes with two local advertisers:
+pL )
• The global advertiser bids b∗G,N A = γvG pH +p(pLH−2dp
, and can reduce their bid when b∗G,N A >
H pL v
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γ. The local advertisers bid their expected value per impression γvi , but can reduce their bid
for high values of vi when d < 0 and still maintain the same profit.
• The global advertiser bids above the local advertisers when d > 0 and below the local advertisers
when d < 0.
• The global advertiser bids below the optimal bid at the popular publisher.
Lemma 1 shows that when a global advertiser is facing two local advertisers, the advertiser will
deviate from bidding their expected value for one impression because of the externality between the
two publishers. It is interesting to see that when the returns to advertising are decreasing (but still
positive), the global advertiser will lower her bids, while she will increase them when d > 0. When
d < 0, the ability to track the same customer over multiple publishers increases the potential profit
the advertiser can achieve, but decreases the average potential profit per publisher the advertiser
will achieve. Thus, maximizing her profit requires the global advertiser to lower her bid. When
d > 0, however, the externality is strong enough that even increasing her bid will compensate the
global advertiser in her revenue more than the increased cost paid because of stronger competition
with the local advertiser.
The third item begins to shed light on which of the publishers may benefit more from efficiency
in the market when advertisers become more global. As can be seen, the global advertiser will
underestimate the potential income from the popular publisher, and will bid less than it could have
bid if the market had no uncertainty in it.
Using the bidding strategies from Lemma 1 we can find the expected profits of the global and
local advertisers and the revenues of the publishers. We can then compare them to the case when
there are no global advertisers. The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1.
• The profit of the global advertiser is higher than if it was local. The profit of a local advertiser
is higher than if it was competing with a local advertiser when d < 0 and lower otherwise.
√
4d2 pH pL +4dpL +1−1
• When d > 0 and v >
, there is no value in using attribution.
2(d2 pH pL +dpL )
• When d < 0 the expected revenue of each publisher decreases when one advertiser is global
compared to when all advertisers are local.
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Proposition 1 shows that when advertising returns are positive, the profit of the global advertiser
will increase even without a sophisticated and efficient allocation of advertising returns. A somewhat
surprising result is also that the profits of the local advertisers are increasing when global advertisers
can target their customers better and d < 0. This phenomenon is a consequence of the weaker
bidding strategy the global advertiser is employing, which allows the local advertiser to pay less
than it would have paid if they competed with another local advertiser. Essentially we see that in
this case decreasing advertising returns and the ability to track users across publishers softens the
competition in the market.
The second item of the proposition reveals another interesting result – if advertising returns are
increasing and the global advertiser’s valuation for consumers is high enough, the profit when not
using any attribution method will be as high as the optimal profit when the state of the world is
known. The intuition behind this result is that when d and v are large enough, the optimal bid of
the global advertiser at both publishers is higher than the highest bid of a local advertiser. In this
case the second price auction serves as insurance for the global advertiser against paying too much
per impression. Thus, as long as the bid without attribution is set higher than the bid of the local
advertiser, the advertiser will reach maximal profit even without attribution.
Finally, we see that when d < 0, publishers will have lower revenues compared to when all
advertisers are local. The publishers in this market suffer from two effects. Because one advertiser
now faces decreasing returns, her potential extracted value from consumers is lowered, which lowers
the rent that the publishers can extract. In addition to that, because the global advertiser also
bids with a weaker strategy, the local advertiser pays less for the same ads for which he would pay
more if she competed with a local advertiser.
Adding insult to injury, the popular publisher will suffer the biggest loss of revenue as a corollary
to Lemma 1. This may partially explain why large publishers (such as Google and Facebook) are
eager to provide advertisers with analytics technology (including attribution), that is oftentimes
provided for free. If the publishers believe they are more frequented by the target customers of the
advertisers, they may benefit from the advertisers using such technology.
These results emphasize how externalities and uncertainty change ad allocation and profits in
the market when consumers multi-home and an advertiser switches to running a multi-publisher
campaign. The profits of publishers decrease because the uncertainty about visits lowers the ef-
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ficiency of the second price auction in allocating ads and in extracting rent, but also decreases
the level of competition between the advertisers. Many solutions for this problem focus on what
publishers and platforms can do to improve the allocation. For example, data is aggregated across
a network to create an information asymmetry that can be used to price ads differently, and consequentially increase the profits of publishers. In our setup, publishers will not be able to know
whether a consumer is multi-homing or not and respond accordingly. However, advertisers are able
to respond to these effects by using the information they collect in the campaign. In the next
sections we focus on the effect of attribution – the process by which advertisers try to resolve the
uncertainty they face and improve their competitive positioning in the market.

5

The Role of Attribution

The previous section found that the global advertiser resorts to submitting an equal bid to both
publishers because of the uncertainty about the market state. The goal of an attribution function
is to associate revenues with specific publishers. The advertiser can then change her bids until the
associated attribution of each publisher is optimized.
Many advertisers define campaign attribution as “the process by which marketers quantify the
contribution of various media in an ad campaign to its desired impact”.13 The result of this process
(typically) is an allocation of credit to the two publishers such that the sum of the allocation equals
the total campaign revenue. We will therefore make the following definition:
Definition 1 (Attribution Function). An attribution function separates the revenue r of a campaign that uses publishers 1 and 2 to two values A1 (r) and A2 (r) s.t. r = A1 (r) + A2 (r). Aj is the
revenue attributed to publisher j.
The results of an attribution function are then typically used to estimate the attributed ROI
to each publisher (See, e.g., Borgs et al. (2007), Geyik et al. (2014), Li et al. (2015)) and bids are
then changed to equalize the ROI between the different platforms. Since maximizing ROI does
not necessarily maximize profit, we will analyze the impact of the attribution function when the
advertiser sets the bids such that the attributed profit to each publisher is maximized:14
13

See “2016 is the Year of Attribution” at http://www.iab.com/news/2016-is-the-year-of-attribution/.
If the advertiser is budget constrained, this would be equal to setting the marginal ROIs to being equal between
the two publishers.
14
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Definition 2 (Attribution Maximizing Bids).
b∗G1 = arg max A1 (r(bG1 , bG2 )) − c1 (bG1 , bG2 )
bG1

b∗G2 = arg max A2 (r(bG1 , bG2 )) − c2 (bG1 , bG2 )
bG2

In this definition r(·, ·) is the total revenue generated by the campaign. cj (·, ·) is the cost
associated with publisher j when bids bG1 and bG2 are submitted. Because attribution is calculated
during or after a campaign was run, the revenue r and costs c are the actual costs observed following
the campaign, and hence reflect the true state of the world facing the advertiser.
The setup in Definition 2 is equivalent to the definition of a Nash equilibrium where the two
publishers are allocated a share of the revenue. As such, the attribution process can be seen
as creating a virtual competition between the two publishers which is being simulated by the
advertiser to find the equilibrium allocation. In this case, the result of Holmstrom (1982) holds
and the allocation of bids will be an inefficient advertising effort (ad exposure). Consequentially,
some publishers will always be allocated bids (or budgets) that are suboptimal.
Since there are many functions for which r = A1 (r) + A2 (r), the advertiser’s goal is to pick
an attribution function that maximizes her profit subject to the constraint that each publisher
maximizes their individual attributed profit. When the first order conditions are sufficient for
Definition 2, the following first order conditions will hold for the optimal bids defined in Definition
2:
∂c1 (b∗G1 , b∗G2 ) ∂A2 (r(b∗G1 , b∗G2 ))
∂c2 (b∗G1 , b∗G2 )
∂A1 (r(b∗G1 , b∗G2 ))
=
,
=
∂bG1
∂bG1
∂bG2
∂bG2

(4)

Using this set of first order conditions as a constraint, we can now write the full attribution
problem as:
Definition 3 (Attribution Problem).
max π(b∗G1 , b∗G1 )

(5)

A1 (r) + A2 (r) = r

(6)

∂A1 (r(b∗G1 , b∗G2 ))
∂c1 (b∗G1 , b∗G2 ) ∂A2 (r(b∗G1 , b∗G2 ))
∂c2 (b∗G1 , b∗G2 )
=
,
=
∂bG1
∂bG1
∂bG2
∂bG2

(7)

A1 ,A2

s.t.

19

Definition 3 shows that the goal of the advertiser is to maximize their profit over the space of
available attribution functions within the constraints defining the problem. This complex optimal
control problem does not necessarily have a closed form solution. The solution also highly depends
on the parameters of the profit function of the campaign, which is why we focus on analyzing two
commonly used attribution mechanisms, namely the last-touch (LT) method and the Shapley value
(Sh) method. The online appendix shows that these methods belong to a family of methods we call
Fixed Externality Share method and analyzes their efficiency. In what follows, we compare these
popular attribution functions to two benchmarks – a case when no attribution is being used (NA),
and the optimal allocation possible when there is no market uncertainty (Opt). Using this analysis
we are also able to calculate an upper bound on how optimal (or suboptimal) each attribution
method is, and under what conditions. We perform the analysis in the case of decreasing returns
(d < 0), and discuss the impact of increasing returns in the conclusion.

5.1

Last-Touch Attribution and Shapley Value Attribution

Last-touch attribution allocates credit to the last publisher that has shown an ad prior to conversion.
In our model, because consumers may convert immediately after seeing an ad, the revenue from a
consumer that was exposed to two ads may be attributed to both the first publisher and the second
publisher depending on the timing of conversions.
Using the general profit function of the advertiser in Equation 2, the revenue attributed to
publisher 1 assuming it is the first in order of visits using last-touch will be:
ALT
1

Z

∞

=p1 (1 − p2 )
I[bG1 > b1 ]γvG dF1 (b1 )
0
Z ∞Z ∞
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 <= b2 ]γvG dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
+p1 p2
Z0 ∞ Z0 ∞
+p1 p2
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ]γvG dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
0
0
Z ∞
= p1 γvG
I[bG1 > b1 ]dF1 (b1 ) = p1 γvG F1 (bG1 )

(8)

0

The revenue attributed to publisher 2 under last-touch assuming it is visited second by con-
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sumers will be:
Z ∞
I[bG2 > b2 ]γvG dF2 (b2 )
ALT
=(1
−
p
)p
1 2
2
0
Z ∞Z ∞
I[bG1 <= b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ]γvG dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
+p1 p2
Z0 ∞ Z0 ∞
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ]γ(1 + d)vG dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
+p1 p2
0
Z ∞Z ∞
Z ∞0
I[bG1 > b1 ]I[bG2 > b2 ]dF1 (b1 )dF2 (b2 )
I[bG2 > b2 ]dF2 (b2 ) + p1 p2 dγvG
=p2 γvG
0

0

0

=p2 γvG F2 (bG1 ) + p1 p2 dγvG F1 (bG1 )F2 (bG2 )

(9)

Inspecting the two attribution functions, we see that increasing the bid at publisher 1 will decrease
the attributed revenue to publisher 2 when d < 0 and will increase it when d > 0 because of the
externality term. In other words, publisher 2 receives (or suffers) the impact of the externality
between the publishers because it comes later in the visit process of the consumer.
It is easy to show that when using the last-touch attribution function, the first order conditions
for the optimal bids are also sufficient to fulfill the conditions in Definition 2 on the optimal bids.
Hence we can calculate the new equilibrium bidding strategies of the local and global bidders and
analyze the resulting profit of each bidder.
Performing the analysis yields the following result:
Proposition 2. Using last-touch attribution:
• The global advertiser will bid b∗Gj1 = γvG if j1 is the first publisher visited, and b∗Gj2 =
2 if j is the second publisher visited. The local advertisers will bid their expected
γvG + pj1 dγvG
2

values per impression.
• The number of ads allocated to the global advertiser will increase beyond the optimal number
when d < 0.
• The expected profit of the global advertiser will be higher than without using attribution when
d < 0 only if pL is small.
Proposition 2 illustrates how last-touch attribution distorts the incentives of an advertiser causing her to overbid and as a result overspend and receive lowered profit in an advertising campaign.
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The intuition behind the results is that last-touch attribution causes the elasticity of the bid bG1
to be estimated from the revenue generated at publisher 1, and disregards the externality imposed
on the revenue at publisher 2.
A surprising result from this analysis is that unlike common belief, last-touch attribution causes
an overestimate of the returns of the publishers which are earlier in the conversion funnel, and not
necessarily later. This is because in a concave revenue function, earlier ad impressions have a
negative externality on later impressions, and not taking them into account overestimates the
impact of earlier impressions. In addition to the earlier publisher benefitting, we find that the bid
at the second publisher is lower when d < 0, and even lower when the first publisher is popular.
That means that niche publishers that come later in a conversion funnel will suffer more when
last-touch attribution is applied.
Finally, we see that applying last-touch attribution actually reduces the profit of the advertiser
below the profit she would make without using any attribution function at all, unless pL is small
(has to be less than 1/3, and usually smaller). When pL is small, the market is one where most
consumers visit only one publisher. In that case, the timing of visits of customers is indicative of
both which has the higher probability of visit, as well as which publisher is visited first. Last-touch
attribution is well suited to measure order effects, if they are indicative of the actual process that
determines conversions, and when most consumers visit only one publisher.
This analysis gives a potential explanation for why advertisers have chosen to use last-touch
attribution beyond the simplicity of its implementation. In a market where externalities are small
in magnitude because of low co-occurence of visits of customers, last-touch can be used to properly
model the order of visits and improve the profits of advertisers compared to not using attribution.
Another attribution method that has been proposed in the literature is using the Shapley value
to attribute profit to publishers. This method has become popular recently as the “data-driven”
method implemented in Google’s attribution solution.15
The Shapley value (Shapley 1952) is a cooperative game theory solution concept that allocates
value created among players in a cooperative game. The value is defined as following for our model:
ASh
1 =
15

r(b1 ,b2 )−r(0,b2 )+r(b1 ,0)−r(0,0)
2

ASh
2 =

r(b1 ,b2 )−r(b1 ,0)+r(0,b2 )−r(0,0)
2

https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/3191594?hl=en.
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(10)

The value takes the average marginal contribution of the publishers at the points (b1 , b2 ) and (b1 , 0)
for publisher 1 and similarly for publisher 2.
The reason to focus on the Shapley value is that it has two desirable properties in an attribution
function. The first is called the Efficiency property, which means that all value created by the players
is allocated, and the sum of the values equals the total revenue generated. The second property
described in Young (1988) is called the Marginality property, which says that if two players have
the same marginal contribution in all possible order of players, their attribution will be equal.
Moreover, the Shapley value is agnostic of the actual function that generates conversions and makes
no assumptions on the shape of the function. Hence it is quite robust to model misspecification.
The analysis of the equilibrium bids and allocation when using Shapley value attribution shows
the following result:
Proposition 3. When using the Shapley Value to optimize the bids of the advertiser and when
d < 0:
• When v is low and pL is low, the global advertiser bids less than the optimal value at the
popular publisher, and bids above the optimal value otherwise. The global advertiser always
bids above the optimal value at the unpopular publisher.
√

• When v <

3−1
−dpH ,

the profit using Shapley value attribution is higher than the profit with no

attribution. When v ≥

√

3−1
−dpH

the profit is higher than no attribution if pL is low.

• There exists a pcL such that if pL < pcL , the profit using Shapley value attribution is higher
than both the last-touch and the no-attribution profits.
• There is no case when d < 0 in which last-touch attribution generates more profit than both
no-attribution and Shapley value attribution.
Proposition 3 shows that using the Shapley value as an attribution mechanism is beneficial
when the value of a conversion is below some threshold, or for high values of v when pL is small
√
enough. The upper bound on the value of v at the worst case is 3 − 1 ≈ 0.732, and increases with
lower pH and d closer to zero. Consequentially the Shapley value increases the profit of a global
advertiser for a wide range of parameter values.
The second item shows that when pL is low enough, implying there is enough asymmetry
between the two publishers, then the Shapley value yields the highest profit among the three
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attribution methods we are comparing. The intuition is that in these cases, similarly to the lasttouch method, the Shapley value takes into account the asymmetric effect on conversion which
comes mostly from the popular publisher. Unlike last-touch attribution, however, the Shapley
value is order agnostic and thus is better able to take into account the externality imposed by the
first visited publisher on the second publisher.
The last item of the proposition shows the surprising result that last-touch attribution is not
beneficial to advertisers on the entire range of the parameters when the other two methods are
available. We basically see that for low values of pL , when last-touch is more effective than not
using attribution, the Shapley value is even more effective, while for high values of pL , either no
attribution or the Shapley value are more effective.
Another interesting conclusion from this analysis is that when visit probabilities are high and
when valuations are high, there is little benefit to using any attribution process. This result can
explain why advertisers may be dissatisfied after they employ an attribution method and discover
no benefit (or even decreased profits). The intuition behind this result is that when pH and v are
high enough, the optimal bids of the publisher when they have complete information will be to bid
the same value at both publishers. In this case, there will be no difference in bidding strategies
between not having any information (the NA case) and having complete information (the Opt case).
If the global advertiser decides to apply an attribution method in this setting, they will find out
that they cannot improve their profit beyond the optimal profit, and will be surprised to learn that
attribution has little value for them.

5.2

Impact on Ad Allocation Efficiency

Advertisers usually see the goal of attribution as helping them to compete in the market vs. better
informed advertisers. Publishers may also prefer that advertisers use specific attribution methods
vs. others as it may cause overbidding and enhance their profits. The research on uncertainty
in advertising markets that takes the publisher perspective often focuses on methods that will
increase the ad allocation efficiency in the market. It is unclear, however, whether allocation
efficiency should be the goal of an advertising network or platform, nor of an advertiser. Efficient
allocation mechanisms maximize welfare, but not necessarily the profit of the platform, which is
the market designer in this case. For example, the commonly used second price auction is efficient
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for one item, but does not maximize the profit of the platform in many cases.
To analyze the efficiency of ad allocation, we will focus on the welfare implications of uncertainty
and attribution, as it allows us to perform an analysis without too many assumptions about the
allocation mechanism in the market which may impact ad allocation but not total welfare. The
total welfare in our model is the sum of profits of advertisers and publishers. Since the income of
publishers are comprised only of transfers from advertisers the total welfare is equal to the sum
of revenues of advertisers. This simplifying observation allows us to find the maximum potential
welfare without any assumption about the specific ad mechanism the publishers may use. Because
the welfare is equal to the sum of advertiser revenues, the most efficient ad allocation is the one
that generates the most revenue from visiting consumers, conditional on their visit path.
After we find this revenue, we compare it to the revenue achieved by the advertisers when they
use the different attribution methods we analyze (N A, Sh, LT and Opt), and when the publishers
use the second price auction we described before.
Performing the analysis yields the following result for the optimal outcome:
Lemma 2. When d < 0, the maximum expected revenue possible in the market is


1
γ pH d3 pL + 3d2 pL + 3dpL + 8 + 8pL
12
The revenue increases with pH , pL and d.
Although it is quite straightforward to find the welfare maximizing allocation,16 calculating the
total market revenue is surprisingly complex for the different attribution methods. The difficulty
comes from the fact that the global advertiser who is exposed to externalities usually uses nonlinear bidding strategies in equilibrium. This, in turn, makes it difficult to calculate the revenues
of the local advertisers. We are able to find closed form results for the market revenues in the N A,
LT and Sh cases. We are unable to find a closed form for the total revenue in the Opt case, and
we therefore use numerical computation. Figure 1 shows the result of this analysis for two cases.
Both panels display the ratio of the expected revenue of advertisers using the methods we analyzed
to the expected revenue of advertisers in the optimal allocation scenario.
In the left panel, the worst case scenario for the Shapley value is displayed, which occurs when
16

The details appear in the proof of Lemma 2.
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Figure 1: Expected relative welfare of the Sh, LT , N A and Opt cases to the maximum potential.
Left panel: γ = 1/2, pH = 1 and d = −1. Right panel: γ = 1/2, pH = 1/2 and d = −1/4.
pH = 1, d = −1 and pL = 1. In this extreme case, the advertisers would like to show only the first
ad in a sequence (as the second is worthless). Even in this extreme case, the Shapley value is able
to achieve 94.33% of the potential maximum welfare. Numerical analysis shows that last-touch
achieves 94.5% and no-attribution reaches 95.4% in their respective worst case scenarios. These
results generally illustrate that market inefficiency is not high even when advertisers have complete
certainty about the market state.
The right panel presents the case of pH = 1/2, pL = 1/4 and d = −1/4. All of the methods in
this case reach over 99% of the maximum potential welfare, and the differences between them are
very small. We see that last-touch attribution is quite efficient for low values of pL . These are the
cases where most visits go to one publisher and the externality is very small. Similarly to the case
of the global advertiser’s profit before, such markets are ideal for using a method like last-touch.
When pL is higher, we see that the Shapley value improves efficiency beyond last-touch, but is
unable to improve it above the cases of Opt and no-attribution. Since the Shapley value is designed
as a method to give advantage to advertisers and not to generate market efficiency, this result is
not surprising.
The conclusion from the analysis is that attribution methods may have a non-trivial impact on
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welfare. A method like last-touch, that encourages an advertiser to over-bid, may increase welfare
by transferring revenue to the publishers and to the local advertisers. A method like the Shapley
value, that may create less aggressive bidding, may actually lower welfare. In all cases, however,
the decrease in welfare is not dramatic compared to having complete information. The majority
of the impact of attribution methods will be by transferring profits from publishers to advertisers,
but not by decreasing allocation efficiency in the market.

5.3

Optimality for Advertisers

A question that naturally arises from the results of the previous section is how well do the different
attribution methods perform and how far they are from the optimal profit that an advertiser
can achieve with full information (Opt). To perform this analysis, we calculate the ratio of the
∗ ,π ∗ and π ∗ for the no attribution, last-touch and Shapley value attributions
expected profits πN
A LT
Sh
∗
respectively to the optimal expected profit πOpt
when d < 0. We call these ratios the conditional

ratios on v. We further integrate the expressions for the expected profits over v and then take
their ratios. We call these ratios the unconditional ratios. For example, for the Shapley value the
conditional ratio is

∗
πSh
∗
πOpt

R1

and the unconditional ratio is

R 01
0

∗ dv
πSh
∗ dv
πOpt

.

For each of the ratios we calculate the parameter values where they achieve their minimum and
maximum. Since the expressions do not have closed forms, we perform a numeric analysis to find
these values.17 For completeness, the expressions are detailed in the Appendix.
The conditional ratio indicates how each method performs for specific environment values as well
as consumer values for an action, while the unconditional ratio gives the advertiser an indication of
how their profit will deviate from optimum over multiple campaigns on average. This analysis can
naturally be extended to include distributions for values of pH , pL and d, though these parameters
should fluctuate less often than the values of conversions.
The results of the analysis show that all methods achieve a maximum ratio of 1 for different
parameter values. As such, there are multiple conditions under which each method may be optimal,
which is why we focus on the worst case outcomes. When analyzing the worst and average worst
case scenarios, we find that in the conditional case the ratios are all minimized when pH = 1, v = 1
and d = −1. In other words, all methods perform the worst in the extreme case when one publisher
17

We thank the Editor and Associate Editor for suggesting this analysis.
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is visited all the time and where only the first impression has impact on the consumer (because
d = −1). The minimal ratios are 0.875 for the Shapley and last-touch methods, and ∼ 0.888 for
the no attribution method. Figure 2 illustrates the value of the ratio when pH = 1, d = −1 and
v = 1 for different values of pL . We also see in this figure that in this extreme case the Shapley
value performs quite well when pL < 0.5 with profits achieving 90% of the potential optimal profit.
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Figure 2: Conditional Expected Profit Ratios when v = 1, pH = 1 and d = −1.
The results from the analysis of the unconditional ratios also show that the minima are achieved
at the extreme cases when pH = 1 and d = −1. In this case not using attribution achieves 93.9%
of the optimal profit, the Shapley value achieves 92.8% while last-touch achieves 92%. We also
see that when pL < 0.4 the Shapley value achieves at least 95% of the optimal profit, while when
pL > 0.5, using no attribution achieves at least 95% of the profit.
These results taken together illustrate the implications of the propositions from the previous
sections. When the asymmetry between publishers or the effect of the second ad is not substantial,
using attribution methods may be counter-effective for an advertiser as it will reduce the effectiveness of advertising by creating a competition between publishers when one is not needed. When
there is enough asymmetry, however, or when the externality is strong, using attribution, and
particularly the Shapley value may yield advertiser profits which are close to the optimal possible.
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Figure 3: Unconditional Expected Profit Ratios when pH = 1 and d = −1.
An additional point in the interpretation of these results is that since our model only has two
publishers, we expect the effect of full information to not yield as much improvement in allocation
efficiency as in the case of competition between a larger number of publishers. Similarly to the case
of a centralized planner versus an oligopoly, increasing the number of competing firms will make
the equilibrium result closer to the Pareto efficient outcomes. As campaigns become more complex
and with more publishers, we expect the effect of attribution to be more noticeable compared to
not using attribution, and these results to be sharpened.

5.4

Comparative Statics

The conclusion of the previous section was that an attribution scheme may not necessarily benefit
advertisers compared to not using attribution at all. In this section we analyze the impact of
changes in the environment on the profits of advertisers using different schemes to understand the
potential robustness of each attribution method.
Integrating an attribution method into an advertiser’s campaign process requires data integration from multiple sources and fine tuning the algorithm parameters to match the market state.
When markets change (for example, when one publisher becomes more popular), it is desirable that
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an attribution scheme remains as effective and not require replacement or reconfiguration.
We perform a comparative statics analysis on the outcomes from the previous sections to check
the robustness of the different attribution schemes to market changes. The analysis reveals the
following:
Proposition 4. When market parameters change:
• The profit of the global advertiser increases under all three method (LT , N A, Sh) with an
increase in γ, d, v or pH .
• The profit of the global advertiser increases with pL only when v is small enough.
Proposition 4 shows that the attribution methods we analyze are robust to market changes
unless pL changes and the asymmetry between the publishers decreases for high values of v. When
pL increases, the effect of the externality increases which may lower the benefit of the attribution
schemes (and increase the bias from the no-attribution method), due to the increased possibility of
seeing the same consumer twice in the campaign, and the increased bid at the publisher with lower
visit popularity. This effect increases competition and may decrease the profit of the advertisers if
they mostly win impressions, which happen when v is high. If v is low enough, the increased visit
probability pL contributes to increased revenues, but the increase in cost does not offset it and the
profits increase.
In contrast to these results, the expected optimal profit (when there is no market uncertainty)
increases for an increase of any parameter. One conclusion is that for an advertiser with a high
value for consumers, attribution may be a double edged-sword if they advertise on many websites,
including non-popular ones.
Another action an advertiser may take is to try and influence consumers by changing her ads
so they have a stronger effect in the first impression by increasing γ to γ̂ > γ while maintaining the
overall conversion rate after seeing two ads at γ + γ(1 + d). In this case the advertiser controls how
conversions are allocated between the first and second impression, for example by changing the ad
copy.
The analysis shows the following results:
Proposition 5. When the advertiser increases the impact of the first impression:
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• The distance from the optimal profit will increase without attribution or using the Shapley
value.
√

• There is a range of parameters of d, pH and pL such that if v >

10−1
3

the distance from the

optimal profit will decrease using last-touch attribution.
• Under last-touch, the attributed revenue to the first publisher will always increase, and will
increase for the second publisher only when v is small.
• Using the Shapley value, there is a range of values of pH such that when when pL · v is high
enough the attribution to both publishers decreases.
The analysis in proposition 5 sheds more light on the effects of the different attribution methods
and which type of publishers should benefit from which methods. The first two items show that
when the conversions shift towards the first impression, last-touch attribution is advantageous for
advertisers since it gets closer to the optimal profit. The intuition is similar to the case of low pL
values found before – when there is high asymmetry between the contribution of each impression,
last-touch can benefit the first advertiser by overemphasizing their effect on conversions.
The last two items compare the effect of increasing γ to γ̂ on the attributed revenue in equilibrium. The results for last-touch attribution are expected and mimic the decrease in distance
from optimal profit. We also see that there are cases where both publishers benefit from such a
re-allocation of conversion rates, which creates a unique case where last-touch increases the profit
of the advertiser and the attributed revenues of the publishers. The Shapley value, however, has
a range of parameters were all players “suffer”. Both the distance from optimal profit increases,
and in addition, the revenue attributed to both publishers decreases. The difference stems from
the fact that the Shapley value allocates the externality d equally between both publishers, and in
such case, if γ increased to γ̂, it means that d has decreased and that the attributed revenue to
both publishers may decrease.

5.5

Ad Prices and Publisher Profits

Finally, we compare the revenues of the two publishers and the expected market price of advertising
when using the different schemes. Our goal is to understand how moving from a simple attribution
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method like last-touch to a more sophisticated method like the Shapley value will influence the ad
price dynamics in the market.
Proposition 6. When d < 0:
• The first publisher will have a higher revenue under last-touch attribution than under the
Shapley value. The second publisher will have a higher revenue under the Shapley value than
under last-touch attribution.
• The expected price of an impression the global advertiser will pay is higher under last-touch
attribution than using either the Shapley value or not using attribution.
Proposition 6 shows that publishers which arrive earlier in a conversion funnel will prefer lasttouch attribution over the Shapley value attribution. The intuition comes from the previous results,
where the revenue attributed to the first publisher increases under last-touch. This yields more
competitive bidding by the global advertiser which translates to higher publisher profit.
The second item shows an interesting result that may explain the current market trends in online
advertising where ad prices are decreasing after a period of increase for mature technologies such
as Google. When firms moved from not using attribution at all to using last-touch attribution,
the price of advertising was expected to increase for the large and global advertisers because of
overbidding and increased competition. When they move to more sophisticated (and efficient)
methods, the result is a decrease in the price paid per impression because of softening competition.
Our model thus provides a prediction for trends in advertising prices that will arise when more
advanced measurement technologies are introduced.

6

Discussion, Limitations and Conclusion

As multi-publisher campaigns become common and new advertising technologies appear in the
market, advertisers find more opportunities to interact with consumers over multiple touch points.
The cumulative effect of advertising creates externalities between individual ad exposures for multihoming consumers, and since these exposures are on different publishers, the measured effectiveness
of each publisher would depend on past exposures of each consumer on other publishers.
As we have shown using our model of a global advertiser competing with two local advertisers,
externalities between exposures coupled with uncertainty about consumer visits to publishers lowers
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the bidding incentives of global advertisers and creates inefficiency in the market that decreases the
revenues of global advertisers and publishers. Past attempts to analyze this problem have shown
that if publishers have an information advantage, for example by being able to track consumers over
a network, then they can exploit this asymmetry to increase the efficiency of ad allocation in the
market through changing the pricing in the market. In contrast to these analyses, our focus on the
case of structural uncertainties, in which publishers cannot gain superior information, allows us to
analyze the impact and potential for using advertiser-side multi-touch attribution. More often than
not, publishers will not be able to identify multi-homing consumers or estimate the externalities
from previous exposures correctly. The results we derive assist in understanding how attribution
may serve to change the incentives in an advertising market and potentially benefit advertisers.
Unlike the focus on advertising optimality in terms of allocation efficiency and social welfare, we
try to understand how advertisers respond to these uncertainties.
Multi-touch attribution uses the information collected by the advertiser during a campaign to
estimate the contribution of each ad exposure (“touch”) to consumer conversions. Our analysis
of the optimization problem the advertiser faces when using multi-touch attribution shows that
this problem is an instance of the teams problem identified in Holmstrom (1982). Because of this
analogy, attribution methods are not expected to fully help the advertiser reverse the effects of
uncertainty and externalities. Furthermore, when taking the equilibrium response of competing
advertisers into account, we found that in many cases a simple attribution method such as lasttouch may lower the profits of a global advertiser compared to not using attribution at all. Using a
method such as the Shapley value, which is less extreme in credit allocation, was found to improve
the profits of advertisers. In both of these cases, however, we are able to show that attribution
may hold limited potential when an advertiser values consumers highly in the market. In these
scenarios uncertainty about consumer visits would not impact the bidding strategy of an advertiser,
and in this case attribution may not yield any improvement over not using it at all. These findings
contribute to the empirical literature on attribution modeling that assumes that more accurate
measurement of the uncertain state of the campaign will always benefit advertisers. Our results
quite clearly show that attribution might be counter-productive because of its competitive effect.
Several interesting questions arise from our analysis and hold potential for further research. The
online appendix uses numerical analysis to look at the case of two global advertisers who compete
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in the market using pay per click pricing. We find that our results hold qualitatively, but we also
find that different amounts of information held by the global advertisers may cause a softening
of the competition in the market. Analyzing attribution as a fully strategic action by advertisers
and not just as a measurement technique will be an interesting question to delve into. A second
constraint in our analysis restricts the publishers to not respond to the actions of the advertisers
by changing their auction structure or the market structure. It is possible, however, that when
faced with attributing advertisers, publishers may decide to invest in attracting different segments
of customers, or develop technology that will allow them to offer behavior based segmentation to
advertisers. Merging the two research areas on behavioral targeting on the publisher side with
attribution on advertiser side would be a logical next step in this area.
The online appendix also focuses on a second question – how optimal are the specific attribution
methods we analyze in comparison to alternative methods. We show that both last-touch and the
Shapley value are part of a family of methods we call fixed externality share (FES) methods, and
that in some cases the Shapley value is optimal, while last-touch is never optimal. In a second
analysis we compare the attribution methods to the maximal gain from using media-mix-modeling
(MMM). In that analysis, that utilizes results from the theory of team compensation, we are
able to show that attribution always gains more than MMM because of its access to individual
level exposure information. These analyses and our formulation of the attribution problem as
an optimal control problem open an interesting area for further research that focuses on finding
optimal attribution methods.
Our paper concludes with an analysis of the welfare implications and stability of attribution
methods in changing markets. Because attribution methods are employed by advertisers which
are not the market designer, we find that they often create a tradeoff between market optimality
measured in allocation efficiency and social welfare, and advertiser optimality, that focuses on
increasing an advertiser’s profits. The focus on allocation efficiency in prior research often leads to
a similar conclusion – increased efficiency comes at the expense of advertiser profits. However, if
advertisers are unable to field profitable advertising campaigns in the market, they may decide to
leave the market altogether, as is recently evident by large advertisers. Focusing on the development
of attribution methods and their impact on market outcomes may serve to counteract this trend,
and our research takes a step forward in that direction.
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A

Proofs

A.1

Proof of Lemma 1

Suppose the equilibrium bidding strategies of the local players have the CDFs F1 (·) and F2 (·) and
those of the global advertiser have the CDFs FG1 (·) and FG2 (·) when observed from viewpoint of
the competing advertiser.
We first need to determine whether the local and global advertisers have full support of their
bidding strategies in the range [0, γ]. Suppose the highest bid a global advertiser will submit is b̄i
at publisher i. We assume that Fi for i ∈ {G1, G2} have PDFs denoted fi (·) and that fi (b) > 0 for
0 ≤ b ≤ b̄i and fi (b) = 0 when b > b̄i .
The expected profit of a local advertiser i is:
Z

∞

I[bi > bGi ](γvi − bGi )dFGi (bGi )

πi (bi ) = 1/2(pH + pL )

(11)

0

The local advertiser will never bid above γ. If they bid above γ and bGi > γ, the advertiser can
increase their profit on that bid by lowering it.
Suppose b̄i ≥ γ. In that case the local advertiser’s expected profit can be written as:
Z

bi

(γvi − bGi )fi (bGi )dbGi

πi (bi ) = 1/2(pH + pL )

(12)

0

Solving for the first order condition yields b∗i = γvi , and Fi (b) = b/γ.
If b̄i < γ, then when the local advertiser bids above b̄i they will have the same profit for any
value of their bid. Solving the maximization problem the advertiser’s bid will be the same as before,
but can be lower than γvi if vi > b̄i /γ.
The first order conditions for the profit of the global advertiser are:
pH + pL
(γvG − bG1 )f1 (bG1 ) + pH pL dγvG f1 (bG1 )F2 (bG2 ) =0
2
pH + pL
(γvG − bG2 )f2 (bG2 ) + pH pL dγvG f2 (bG2 )F1 (bG2 ) =0
2

(13)
(14)

We can see that when the global advertiser bids above the local advertiser’s highest bid, any bid
will generate the same profit.
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Suppose the highest bid of the local advertisers is γ. Then the solution to the FOCs is:
b∗G1,N A = b∗G2,N A = γvG
When vG >

pH +pL
pH +pL +2dpH pL ,

pH + pL
pH + pL − 2dpH pL vG

(15)

the global advertiser can reduce their bid (as long as it is higher than

γ) and still maintain their profit. When d > 0, the highest bid of the global advertiser is higher
than γ, and thus these two bidding strategies constitute an equilibrium, but the global advertiser
can also reduce their bids for high values of vG .
When d < 0, the highest bid of the global advertiser will be lower than γ, and the bidding
strategies are also an equilibrium. In this case the local advertisers can reduce their bids for high
values of vi .
Comparing the bidding strategies of the local and the global advertisers, we can see that the
global advertiser bids above the local advertiser when they have the same valuations if d > 0, while
the global advertiser bids below the local advertiser if they have the same valuation when d < 0
and b̄ > 0, proving the second item of the lemma.
To compare the global advertiser’s bid with uncertainty to the optimal bid without uncertainty,
we solve for the same equilibrium but using the profit function in Equation 2 and not the expected
profit.
The equilibrium solution (using the same method as above) is that the local advertisers maintain
1+dpH v
∗
Lv
bidding γvi , while the global advertiser bids: b∗G1,Opt = γv 1−d1+dp
2 p p v 2 , bG2,Opt = γv 1−d2 p p v 2 .
H L
H L

Comparing these value to b∗G,N A , we find the result of the third item.

A.2

Proof of Proposition 1

To prove the items in the proposition, we calculate the expected profits of the global and local
advertisers using the bidding strategies from Lemma 1, as well as the costs both advertisers face,
which constitute the revenue of the publishers. In addition, we calculate the expected profit and
costs of a local advertiser facing a local advertiser. Throughout the proof we will make repeated
use of the inequality log(1 + x) ≥

2x
2+x

when x > 0 and reverse otherwise. The calculations result
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in:
∗
πLocal
=

∗
πLocal,N
A =

1 2
γv (pH + pL )
4




p +p
γ(p +p )2 2dpH pL v+(pH +pL ) log 2dp p Hv+pL +p

H L
H
L
 H L

(16)

8d2 p2
p2
H L

 −2dp p +p +p 
H L
H
L
 γ(pH +pL ) 2dpH pL (2dpH pL v+pH +pL )+(pH +pL )2 log
p +p



H

8d2 p2
p2
H L

L

v≤

pH +pL
pH +pL −2dpL pH

d ≤ 0 and v >

pH +pL
pH +pL −2dpL pH

(17)
∗
πN
A,Local

=





γv 2 (pH +pL )2
2(pH +pL )−4dpH pL v


 1 γ(2v(dpH pL + pH + pL ) − pH − pL )
2

v<

pH +pL
2dpH pL +pH +pL

v≥

pH +pL
2dpH pL +pH +pL

(18)

∗
In the above notation, πLocal
is the profit of a local advertiser competing with a local advertiser.
∗
∗
πLocal,N
A is the profit of a local advertiser competing with a global advertiser, and πN A,Local is the

profit of a global advertiser competing with a local one.
∗
∗
Proving the first item is a simple comparison of the profit πN
A,Local and πLocal . To prove the
∗
∗
second part of the item, the difference πLocal,N A − πLocal when d < 0 equals:






−2dpH pL v

(p +pL ) 2dpH pL v+(pH +pL ) log 1+

pH +pL

 H
2
1 γ(p

−
2v
+
p
)



H
L

8
d2 p2 p2


H L
∗
∗




πLocal,N A − πLocal =
−2dpH pL


2dpH pL (2dpH pL v+pH +pL )+(pH +pL )2 log 1+

pH +pL
1

2

−
2v
γ(p
+
p
)


H
L 

2 2 2
8
d p p
H L

−2dpH pL v
pH +pL
−2dpH pL v
pH +pL in

Because
with x =

p

+p

p

+p

L
v ≤ p +p H−2dp
H
L
L pH

(19)
L
v > p +p H−2dp
H
L
L pH

(including for v = 1) is positive when d < 0 we can replace the log term
the logarithm inequality (and with v = 1 were appropriate), and show using

standard algebra that the difference is positive for the entire range of our parameters. When d > 0,
a similar exercise shows that the difference is always negative, thus proving the first item.
To prove the second item, we find the expected profit of the global advertiser when they know
the state of the world in advance using their optimal bids found in Lemma 1. The resulting expected
profit is:



γv 2 (2dpH pL v+pH +pL )




2−2d2 pH pL v 2










 γ d4 p2 p3 v4 +d2 p p2 v 2 (v(2dp (v+1)v+v+2)−2)+2p v dp v dp v2 −1 −1 −p v2 +p
H L
H
L
H
H
H
L
H L
∗

2
πOpt = −

2 d2 pH pL v 2 −1






1

 2 γ(2v(dpH pL + pH + pL ) − pH − pL )

q

v<

4d2 pH pL +4dpH +1−1


2 d2 pH pL +dpH

q

v

4d2 pH pL +4dpH +1−1


≤v
2 d2 pH pL +dpH
q
4d2 pH pL +4dpL +1−1


≥
2 d2 pH pL +dpL

q

<

4d2 pH pL +4dpL +1−1


2 d2 pH pL +dpL

(20)

Comparing the expected optimal profit to the expected profit with no attribution we receive
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the condition in the Proposition, thus proving the second item.
To prove the third item, we calculate the expected costs of each advertiser. We sum the costs
of the local and global advertiser when they compete against one another and take the difference
from the cost of two local advertisers that are competing against one another. We then integrate
the difference over v ∈ [0, 1] to calculate the expected difference in revenues of the publisher.
We perform the calculation only for the case of the publisher having visit prob. pH , because
for the other advertiser the difference is just a multiple by

pL
pH .

The resulting difference is:

γ

2 2
2
2dpH pL (dpH pL +pH +pL )(p2
H (8d pL −3)−6pH pL −3pL )
−2dpH pL +pH +pL

− 3(pH + pL )2 (2dpH pL + pH + pL ) log



−2dpH pL +pH +pL
pH +pL



24d3 p2H p3L
(21)

When d < 0 the denominator is negative, and hence we can solve the inequality:




2dpH pL (dpH pL + pH + pL ) p2H 8d2 p2L − 3 − 6pH pL − 3p2L
−2dpH pL
−3(pH +pL )2 (2dpH pL +pH +pL ) log 1 +
>0
−2dpH pL + pH + pL
pH + pL

Since d < 0,

−2dpH pL
pH +pL

is positive and we can apply the logarithm inequality, which shows the

inequality is always true.
As a result, the revenue of the publishers is lower when they sell to one global and one local
advertiser compared to when they serve to local advertisers.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Proving the first item is a straightforward application of the technique from Lemma 1. The results
are the bidding strategies defined in the proposition.
To prove the second item, we use the equilibrium bidding strategies of the global advertiser
and calculate the expected number of impressions allocated to the advertiser when d < 0. We
denote Imp∗Opt as the expected number of impressions under optimal allocation, and Imp∗LT as the
expected number of impressions under last-touch attribution.
The difference between the number of impressions is:
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Imp∗LT − Imp∗Opt =



pH dpL v 2 + v − 1 + pL (v − 1)





 dpH pL v2 (dpH v+1)(dpL v+1)

2
2

v(γ + dpL v(γ + dpH )) ≥ 1, v(γ + dpH v(γ + dpL )) ≥ 1
v(γ + dpL v(γ + dpH )) < 1, v(γ + dpH v(γ + dpL )) < 1

d pH pL v −1

pH v (d2 pL v (pH (dpL v 2 +v−1)+pL v )−1)+pH




d2 pH pL v 2 −1



2

p
v
d
p
v
p
 L ( H ( L (dpH v2 +v−1)+pH v)−1)+pL

v(γ + dpL v(γ + dpH )) ≥ 1, v(γ + dpH v(γ + dpL )) < 1
v(γ + dpL v(γ + dpH )) < 1, v(γ + dpH v(γ + dpL )) ≥ 1

d2 pH pL v 2 −1

(22)

When d < 0, the difference reduces to

dpH pL v 2 (dpH v+1)(dpL v+1)
,
d2 pH pL v 2 −1

the denominator and numerator

are both negative, and hence the difference is positive, proving the second item.
To prove the third item, we calculate the expected profit of the global advertiser under last-touch
attribution:


1
2



4 γv (pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 4) + 2) + 2pL )


= 1 γ(pH (v(4dpL v + v + 2) − 1) + pL (v(v + 2) − 1))
4






 1 γ d2 pH p2 v 4 + pL (v(2dpH (v + 1)v + v + 2) − 1) + 2pH v 2
L
4

∗
πLT

√

v<
√

v

4dpH +1−1
2dpH

4dpH +1−1
≤v
2dpH
√
L +1−1
≥ 4dp
2dpL

√

<

4dpL +1−1
2dpL

(23)
∗ − π∗
The difference πLT
N A,Local when d < 0 equals:



1 2
2(pH + pL )2
γv −
+ pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 4) + 2) + 2pL
4
−2dpH pL v + pH + pL
This difference is positive only when pL <

√

dpH v+

pH
dpH v(dpH v+8)+8+3

proving the third item. The

highest value of this upper bound is 1/3 achieved at d = −1, pH = 1 and v = 1.

A.4

Proof of Proposition 3

To prove the results we first find the equilibrium bidding strategies of the local and global advertisers
using a method similar to the one in Lemma 1. We find that the local advertiser will continue bid2γ (dpL v 2 +2v )
ding the expected value, while the global advertiser will bid − d2 pH pL v2 −4 at the popular publisher
2(γdpH v 2 +2γv )
and − d2 pH pL v2 −4 at the unpopular publisher.
Comparing these bids to the optimal bids found if Lemma 1, we find that the bid at the
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unpopular publisher is always above the optimal bid when using Shapley
value attribution. The
r
8pL

bid at the popular advertiser is lower than the optimal bid when v >

9− p

H

−3

and pL < 3 −

2dpL

2
pH ,

and higher otherwise.
The expected profit under Shapley value attribution is:




 1 γ(2v(dpH pL + pH + pL ) − pH − pL )


2








2
v 2 (dpL v+2)2
1 γ − 4pH v (dpL +1)(dpL v+2) − 4p
∗
 H
2 + pL (2v − 1)
πSh =
2 p p v 2 −4
2
d

H L
d2 pH pL v 2 −4






 2γv2 (p (dp v(dv(p +p )+8)+4)+4p )


H
L
H
L
L



2
2
2

v≤
2

q

v>

q

2
d2 pH pL +2dpL +1−1
d2 pH pL +2dpL
d2 pH pL +2dpL +1−1

<v
d2 pH pL +2dpL

q
2
d pH pL +2dpH +1−1
2

d pH pL v −4

≤

q

2
d2 pH pL +2dpH +1−1
d2 pH pL +2dpH

d2 pH pL +2dpH

(24)

To compare to the profits with no attribution and last-touch attribution, we limit to the cases
of −1 < d < 0, and calculate:
∗
πLT

−

∗
πN
A

∗
∗
πLT
− πSh



4(pH + pL )2
1 2
+ pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 4) + 2) + 2pL
(25)
= γv
4
4dpH pL v − 2(pH + pL )


1 2
8(pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 8) + 4) + 4pL )
= γv −
+ pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 4) + 2) + 2pL
4
(d2 pH pL v 2 − 4)2
(26)

∗
2
∗
− πN
πSh
A = γv



2(pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 8) + 4) + 4pL )
2

(d2 pH pL v 2 − 4)

+

)2

(pH + pL
4dpH pL v − 2(pH + pL )



∗ − π∗
To prove the second item, we solve the inequality πSh
N A > 0, which holds when v <

(27)
√

3−1

or when pL < p̃L and p̃L is the solution to:


p̃3L d4 p2H v 4 + p̃2L d4 p3H v 4 + 4d3 p2H v 3 − 6d2 pH v 2 + p̃L −6d2 p2H v 2 − 32dpH v − 8 − 8pH = 0
∗ − π∗
The third item is solved in a similar way, solving the two inequalities: πSh
N A > 0 and
∗ − π ∗ < 0. These inequalities hold when p < pc and pc is the solution to:
πLT
L
L
L
Sh



(pcL )3 d2 pH v 2 + (pcL )2 2d2 p2H v 2 + 8dpH v − 12 + pcL d2 p3H v 2 + 8dp2H v + 40pH − 12p2H = 0
∗ −π ∗
The fourth item is a simple application of the same approach with the inequalities: πLT
NA >
∗ − π ∗ > 0.
0 and πLT
Sh
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A.5

Proof of Lemma 2

There are four possible allocations when the consumer visits both publishers, which we label GG,
1G, G2 and 12. Outcome ij means the ad was allocated to advertiser i at publisher 1 and to
advertiser j at publisher 2. There are also two outcomes possible when the consumer visits only
one of the publishers, either 1 and G at publisher 1 and 2 and G at publisher 2.
Each of these outcomes generates specific revenue. For example, outcome GG generates γvG +
γ(1 + d)vG . We solved four sets inequalities when the consumers visits both publishers to find the
ranges in which each outcome generates the maximum revenue. Integrating over vG , v1 and v2 when

1
the consumer visits both publishers yields γ 12
d3 + 3d2 + 3d + 16 p1 p2 when pj is the probability
of visit at publisher j. Similarly, integrating when the consumer visits only one publisher yields
2
3 (p2

− p1 (2p2 − 1)). Summing these two expressions yields the result in the Lemma. A simple

comparative statics analysis shows the total revenue increases in all three parameters.

A.6

Ratios used in Section 5.3

For completeness we detail the ratios used for the numerical analysis of Section 5.3.
These ratios were all calculated using the expected profit expressions found in the previous
proofs using the constraint that d < 0. It is interesting to note that all expected profits are linear
in γ, and hence the value of γ does not affect these ratios.


∗
2 2 − 2d2 pH pL v 2 (pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 8) + 4) + 4pL )
πSh
=
∗
πOpt
(2dpH pL v + pH + pL ) (d2 pH pL v 2 − 4)2

∗
2 − 2d2 pH pL v 2 (pH (dpL v(dv(pH + pL ) + 4) + 2) + 2pL )
πLT
=
∗
πOpt
4(2dpH pL v + pH + pL )

2
2
∗
(pH + pL ) d pH pL v 2 − 1
πN A
=
∗
πOpt
4d2 p2H p2L v 2 − (pH + pL )2
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(28)
(29)
(30)

For the unconditional ratios, we find the following expressions:
R1
R 01
0

R1


√
4 pH pL d3 pH pL (pH + pL ) − 4d2 pH pL (1 + log(4)) − 8d(pH + pL ) + 16 log(4)

 √
√
−1
∗ dv
(d2 pH pL − 4) (pH + pL ) tanh
d pH pL − pH pL (log (1 − d2 pH pL ) + d(dpH pL + pH + pL ))
πOpt

 √

√
16 d2 pH pL − 4 (pH + pL ) tanh−1 21 d pH pL − pH pL log 4 − d2 pH pL


− 2
√
√
(d pH pL − 4) (pH + pL ) tanh−1 d pH pL − pH pL (log (1 − d2 pH pL ) + d(dpH pL + pH + pL ))
∗ dv
πSh

∗ dv
πLT

=

d3 (pH pL )3/2 (pH (3dpL (d(pH + pL ) + 5) + 10) + 10pL )

 √
√
∗
30 (pH + pL ) tanh−1 d pH pL − pH pL (log (1 − d2 pH pL ) + d(dpH pL + pH + pL ))
0 πOpt dv


R1 ∗
+pH +pL
2dpH pL (pH + pL )2 (dpH pL + pH + pL ) + (pH + pL )4 log −2dpHp pL+p
π
dv
H
L
NA

=
R 01 ∗
√
8p2H p2L (log (1 − d2 pH pL ) + d(dpH pL + pH + pL )) − 8(pH pL )3/2 (pH + pL ) tanh−1 d pH pL
0 πOpt dv
R 01

A.7

=

(31)

(32)
(33)

(34)

Proof of Proposition 4

The analysis shows that the derivative of each expected profit function found in the previous proofs
with respect γ, v, d and pH when d < 0 is positive, proving the first item.
The second item holds when

q
2−
v<

4pL
pH

−2

d(pH + 2pL )

if using last-touch attribution; when
v<−

pH + pL
2dpH (pH − pL )

if not using attribution; and when v > v c using the Shapley value when v c solves:
(v c )3 d3 p2H pL + 6(v c )2 d2 pH pL + 12(v c )dpH + 8 = 0

A.8

Proof of Proposition 5

To prove all items, suppose that the total conversion rate, γ + γ(1 + d) = c when c is constant.
dd
Then using the implicit function theorem, dγ
= − 2+d
γ .

If the difference of expected profit is ∆∗ , then we can calculate
d∆∗
∂∆∗ ∂∆∗ dd
=
+
dγ
∂γ
∂d dγ
using the envelope theorem.
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Performing this analysis shows that

d
∗
∗
dγ (πOpt −πSh )

> 0 and

d
∗
∗
dγ (πOpt −πLT )

> 0 for all parameters

values.
d
∗
dγ (πOpt

∗ ) < 0 when v >
− πLT

√

10−1
3

˜ pL > p̃L and pH > p̃H and the cutoff are
when d < d,

defined as the solutions to:

˜
d˜3 v 2 + d˜2 4v 2 − 2v + d(−4v
− 1) − 4 = 0
√ √
d + 2 − 2 d2 + 6d + 10
p̃H =
d2 v + 4dv


p̃3L d5 p2H v 4 + 4d4 p2H v 4 + p̃2L d5 p3H v 4 + 4d4 p3H v 4 + 8d3 p2H v 3 − 4d3 pH v 2 − 8d2 pH v 2

+ p̃L −4d3 p2H v 2 − 8d2 p2H v 2 − 8d2 pH v − 24dpH v − d − 4 − dpH − 4pH = 0

(35)
(36)

(37)

This proves the first two items.
To prove the last two items, we use the same approach but instead of applying it on the difference
from the optimal profit, we apply it to the attributed revenue of each publisher in equilibrium.
d
∗
dγ (A1,LT )

We find that

Similarly, we find that

> 0 always, while

d
∗
dγ (A1,Sh )

< 0 and

d
1
∗
dγ (A2,LT ) > 0 only when v < pH (d+4) .
d
2
∗
dγ (A2,Sh ) < 0 when pL v > (3d+4) and:

8 − 4(d + 4)pL v
8

 < pH <
p
dpL v 2 (d((3d + 4)pL v + 10) + 16)
v d((5d + 8)pL v + 2) + d (d (pL v ((5d + 8)2 pL v + 44d + 144) + 4) + 32(4pL v + 1)) + 64 + 8

A.9

Proof of Proposition 6

To prove the first item, we prove that if the bids of an advertiser in one attribution scheme are
always higher than in another scheme in a specific state, then the revenue of the publishers is higher
in the former scheme.
Suppose that the global advertiser bids b1 (vG ) in attribution scheme one in a specific state with
visit prob. p and b2 (vG ) in scheme two, such that b1 (vG ) > b2 (vG ) and that the local bidder bids
their equilibrium strategy γv.
Then the expected difference in revenue of a publisher in a specific state is:
Z

1Z 1

p
Z

0
0
1Z 1

−
0

Z

I(γv ≥ b1 (vG ))b1 (vG )dvG dv +
Z
I(γv ≥ b2 (vG ))b2 (vG )dvG dv +

0

0
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1Z 1

0
0
1Z 1
0

I(γv < b1 (vG ))γvdvdvG

I(γv < b2 (vG ))γvdvdvG

(38)

We can change the order of integration and collect the integrals to:
Z

1Z 1


(I(γv ≥ b1 (vG ))(b1 (vG ) − γv) − I(γv ≥ b2 (vG ))(b2 (vG ) − γv)) dvG dv

p
0

(39)

0

The integrand can be written as:
I(γv ≥ b2 (vG ))(γv − b2 (vG )) − I(γv ≥ b1 (vG ))(γv − b1 (vG ))

(40)

Because b1 (vG ) > b2 (vG ) for every vG , the difference is always positive, proving that the expected
revenue of the publisher is higher under scheme 1.
To prove the first item of the proposition, it is therefore enough to show that b∗1,Sh (1H) <
b∗1,LT (1H) and b∗1,Sh (1L) < b∗1,LT (1L) for the first publisher, and b∗2,Sh (1H) > b∗2,LT (1H) and
b∗2,Sh (1L) > b∗2,LT (1L) for the second. These inequalities hold for every value of v when d < 0.
To prove the second item, we calculate the cost of advertising in each attribution scheme and
state, the number of impression in each scheme and state, and find the price as the ratio of those.
The expected value over states yields:
E[priceLT ] =



γv d2 p2H pL v 2 + pH d2 p2L v 2 + 4dpL v + 2 + 2pL

8(dpH pL v + pH + pL )

2
pL v 2 +pH (d2 p2
γv (d2 p2

H
L v +8dpL v+4)+4pL )

−


4(dp
p
v+p
+p
)
d2 pH pL v 2 −4)
(
H
L
H
L


2
2 2 2


γv 2 (d2 p2
H pL v +pH (d pL v +8dpL v+4)+4pL )


2
(pH +pL )(d2 pH pL v 2 −4)
E[priceSh ] =
2
2
2 2
2 2 2

p
v
+p
v
+8dp
γv
d
p
d
p
(
(
H
L v+4)+4pL )
H L
L




(d2 pH pL v2 −4)(d2 p2H pL v2 −2pH (dpL v2 +2)−4pL v)


2
2 2
2
2 2 2


 γv (d pH pL v +pH (d pL v +8dpL v+4)+4pL )
(d2 pH pL v2 −4)(d2 pH p2L v2 −2pL (dpH v2 +2)−4pH v)

(41)


v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpH v < 4, v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpL v < 4


v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpH v ≥ 4, v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpL v ≥ 4


v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpH v < 4, v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpL v ≥ 4


v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpH v ≥ 4, v 4γ + d2 pH pL v + 2γdpL v < 4
(42)

E[priceN A ] =





γv 2 (pH +pL )2
4(−2dpH pL v+pH +pL )2

v(2dpH pL + γ(pH + pL )) ≥ pH + pL




γv(pH +pL )
4(−2dpH pL v+pH +pL )

v(2dpH pL + γ(pH + pL )) < pH + pL

(43)

The complexity of the expressions requires numerical analysis. We calculated the maxima of
the ratios

E[priceSh ]
E[priceLT ]

and

E[priceN A ]
E[priceSh ] .

Both of these ratios equal 1 at the maximum which proves the

second item.
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